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Revision of Louisiana's Code of Criminal
Procedure- A Survey of Some of the
Problems
Dale E. Bennett*
The 1928 Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure was a vast
improvement over the then existing hodge-podge of common law
and statutory rules, and incorporated some very worthwhile pro-
cedural reforms, taken largely from the California and Michigan
Codes of Criminal Procedure. Unfortunately, it did not com-
pletely cover the field. In the preface to his annotated edition
of the Code, St. Clair Adams, Chairman of the Code Commission,
stated: "As a Code of Criminal Procedure, it does not embody all
of the rules of pleading, practice, and procedure that are ap-
plicable to the trial of criminal cases. Many of these rules are
not embraced in the Code and will be found in the Revised Stat-
utes, in the Acts of the Legislature, in the common law and in
the jurisprudence of the state."1 Subsequent piecemeal, though
well-meaning, amendments have confused rather than clarified
the procedural pattern intended by the 1928 draftsmen.
The need for revision of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure can best be appreciated by an analysis of the Louisiana
Supreme Court decisions. During a five-year period beginning
on April 1, 1952, a total of 218 criminal cases were appealed -
involving questions of substantive criminal law, criminal pro-
cedure, and evidence. It is significant that 152 of these appeals
were based primarily on controversial issues of criminal pro-
cedure, with many pointing up inadequacies or ambiguities of
the present Code provisions. They touched almost every part of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, with particularly difficult issues
being presented as to prescription, indictments, and the handling
of insanity defenses. Forty-nine decisions were primarily con-
cerned with basic evidence problems (the preparation of a Code
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. This paper is 'based upon a
"Revision Summary," which was prepared by the writer for the Louisiana State
Law Institute, with Edwin L. Blewer, Jr., and Robert J. Donovan, Jr., as student
research assistants. The suggestions made are the personal observations of the
writer and have not been considered by the Louisiana State Law Institute.
1. LA. CODE OF CaM. PRoc. Aim. iii (Adams 1929).
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of Evidence is a companion project with the criminal procedure
revision). Only 18 cases raised serious questions of substantive
criminal law, dealing with articles of the Criminal Code and the
much litigated narcotics law.
As the Louisiana State Law Institute approaches its task of
revising the Code of Criminal Procedure,2 it has facilities and
assistance which were not available in 1928. These include ade-
quate research assistance, sufficient time to consider carefully
all aspects of each problem raised, and a wealth of comparative
material which has since become available. Most significant are
the American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure of
1930, adopted in its entirety by Arizona and in very substantial
measure by Florida, Iowa, North Dakota, and Utah; the Uniform
Rules of Criminal Procedure, adopted by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws and approved by
the American Bar Association in 1952; the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, adopted and promulgated by the United
States Supreme Court in 1946; and various uniform and model
acts dealing with specific procedural areas, such as extradition,
arrest, and probation. The Model Penal Code, which is now in
the process of formulation by the American Law Institute, em-
braces a number of matters, such as lunacy proceedings, arrest,
and prescription, which have been included in the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure. These subjects, in the twilight zone
between substance and procedure, may justifiably be placed in
either category. While they probably will be retained in Louisi-
ana's Code of Criminal Procedure, the carefully drafted pro-
visions of the ALI Model Penal Code should prove invaluable.
Certain state laws (notably those of California, Massachusetts,
Missouri, New York, and Wisconsin) present new procedures in
such trouble spots as indictments, lunacy proceedings, and sen-
tencing. All of these materials will be carefully studied.
Dual and somewhat conflicting objectives must be recognized
in evaluating any rule of criminal procedure. The rules of crim-
inal procedure must carefully safeguard the rights of the accused
by affording him a full opportunity to establish his innocence.
At the same time they should not be so hyper-technical as to pro-
vide loopholes through which the guilty may escape or delay
justice. To these ends the Code of Criminal Procedure must fully
and concisely spell out the basic elements of a fair trial, but with-
2. The work is being done pursuant to a legislative mandate under La. Acts
1956, No. 87.
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out imposing awkward requirements which may be manipulated
to delay and ultimately thwart justice. To the extent that an
existing provision meets those objectives, it should be preserved
and cherished. To the extent that it does not, it should be sup-
plemented or changed.8
Since arrest is normally the initial step in criminal pro-
ceedings, the arrest part of the present Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure 4 will be considered first. Here is an area where failure
to spell out fully the procedures to be followed has resulted in
uncertainty and inconsistency. Such important matters as the
nature and amount of force that may be employed to effect an
arrest are left entirely to the jurisprudence, which is out of har-
mony with modern conditions. The arrest chapter of the revised
code should provide a full statement of the rules of arrest - to
which police officers, and the courts, can look for guidance.5
This is essential to sound and consistent law enforcement.
Consideration should be given to making some provision for
replacing actual arrest with a summons in relatively minor cases.
The summons is definitely preferable to arrest in cases where the
defendant is charged with a petty offense, is well established in
the community, and is not likely to leave the jurisdiction. There
is no good reason to inconvenience such a defendant pending trial
by an arrest, when a summons will be equally as effective in
securing his appearance. To say that the defendant may be re-
leased on bail is not a complete answer since the making of bond
involves a certain amount of delay and inconvenience and is often
beyond the means of a poor but responsible defendant who could
be depended upon to appear in answer to a summons. Provisions
for extensive use of the summons device are found in the ALI
Code of Criminal Procedure,6 the Federal7 and Uniform Rules,8
3. In regard to the scope and nature of the rules of criminal procedure, the
Wickersham Crime Commission stated: "Reduced to its lowest terms, the essen-
tials of a criminal proceeding are: (1) to bring the accused before or within the
power of the tribunal, (2) a preliminary investigation to insure that the crime is
one which should be prosecuted, (3) notice to the accused of the offense charged,
(4) opportunity to prepare for trial, procure witnesses, and make needed investi-
gations, (5) a speedy trial, (6) a fair trial before an impartial tribunal, and (7)
one review of the case as a whole by a suitable appellate tribunal. Criminal pro-
ceedings should be as simple and direct as is consistent with these requirements."
NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16 (1931).
4. LA. R.S. 15:49-84.2 (1950).
5. The rules governing arrest, both with and without a warrant, are carefully
covered in the ALI, CODE OF CRIM. PROC. §§ 1-38 (1930).
6. Id. §§ 12-17.
7. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(b)(2).
8. UNIFORM RULES OF CRIM. PROC. 5(a) (2) (1952).
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and in the Uniform Arrest Act.9 Limited use of the device is
already provided for in minor traffic cases.10
In recent years, serious thought has been given to providing
a legal method for temporary detention of suspicious persons.
The Uniform Arrest Act authorizes a two-hour detention of such
persons, after which they must either be released or arrested.1 1
It is the practice of many police forces to arrest suspicious per-
sons for some vague, minor crime such as vagrancy. The theory
underlying detention provisions is that it is better to legalize a
short period of temporary detention and control it than to permit
the present system, which is subject to great abuse, to continue.
There may be a question as to the constitutionality of this type
of provision. While Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Massa-
chusetts have temporary detention provisions, none of them has
as yet been challenged as violative of the United States or state
constitutions. The American Law Institute is presently consider-
ing the problem in reference to its preparation of a Model Penal
Code. Its treatment of this problem will be significant.
The coroner's inquest often plays an important part in homi-
cide cases. Under Louisiana's present procedures 12 there is no
assurance that this investigation will be made by one who is
adequately trained for the task. The coroner is an elective of-
ficer and is not required to be a licensed pathologist. Sometimes,
especially in the larger cities, a pathologist is employed to per-
form the actual autopsies in violent death cases, but this is sel-
dom true in rural areas. The dangers of a bungled autopsy, in
failing to exculpate an innocent suspect or in failing to find defi-
nitely incriminating evidence, should not be underestimated. In
criticizing an Illinois procedure very similar to that in Louisiana,
Dean Albert J. Harno states: "At this initial stage of the investi-
gation, evidence is often at hand which if competently evaluated
can be of extreme importance in subsequent proceedings that
may arise over the cause of the death. Here, in this investiga-
tion, valuable evidence may be discovered and preserved, or lost,
depending on the skill of the individual who makes the investiga-
tion. The present law dealing with the coroner affords no assur-
ance of his competence for the duties assigned to him. Indeed,
there is concrete and mounting evidence that often he is not
9. UNzFORM ARREST ACT (HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME) § 9 (1942).
10. LA. R.S. 32:371 (1950).
11. UNIFORM ARREST ACT (HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME) 12 (1942).
12. LA. R.S. 15:2840 (1950).
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qualified .... While it is true that neither the state's attorney
nor the grand jury need abide by this verdict of the coroner's
jury, in practice that verdict may be an annoying factor in sub-
sequent proceedings. . . . These prejudgments (findings of the
coroner's jury as to whether a crime was committed) can be
highly disconcerting to the officers of law enforcement who have
the responsibility of instituting and supporting causes of action
that may flow from the death in question. The Missouri Crime
Survey after a careful examination of this question recommend-
ed that the office of coroner be abolished and that the principal
function of that office be vested in a medical examiner.... That
also was the conclusion reached by the Illinois Crime Survey. A
medical examiner system with a qualified staff has been set up
in a number of jurisdictions, including Massachusetts, the City
of New York, and the City of Milwaukee."' 3 While a general
requirement that the coroner be a licensed pathologist is not feas-
ible, some steps should be taken to provide assurance that the
autopsy and coroner's preliminary examination be performed by
a well-qualified person.
Interstate extradition of those charged with crime in one
state and found in another is provided for by the Federal Consti-
tution and statutory authority. Implementing state legislation
has been universally adopted. Since extradition involves the co-
operation of two states, the state seeking to extradite and the
state of asylum, it is particularly important to have uniform
state procedures. The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act,14 em-
bracing what were considered the best features of the various
state laws, has been adopted by forty-one of the forty-eight
states, including Louisiana's neighboring states of Alabama, Ar-
kansas, and Texas. Louisiana should consider adoption of the
Uniform Act and, in view of the special importance of interstate
uniformity, might well heed the Uniform Commissioners' ad-
monition of adoption without change, insofar as the state pro-
cedural pattern permits. A number of Uniform Act provisions
cover situations which are omitted or inadequately covered by
the present Louisiana extradition law. These include extradition
of a criminal who is not technically a "fugitive" from the state,15
13. Harno, Some Needed Changes in Illinois Criminal Procedure, ILLINoIS LAW
FoRum 425, 427 (1953).
14. Approved 'by the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1926
(with a few amendments approved in 1936), and by the Interstate Crime Com-
mission in 1936. These two groups have cooperated in recommending adoption by
the several states.
15. Section 6 of the Uniform Act authorizes extradition if an act outside the
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or the re-extradition of one who has been voluntarily relin-
quished for trial in the state of present asylum. 1 6 The necessary
extradition papers are much more clearly and fully specified in
the Uniform Act than in Louisiana's present procedures. An im-
portant policy question is presented as to whether Louisiana
should follow the Uniform Act provision and make it the duty
of the Governor to extradite a fugitive, 17 or should retain its
present rule that delivery of the fugitive is discretionary with
the Louisiana chief executive.' 8 Forty of the forty-one states
adopting the Uniform Act retain the mandatory duty. This is in
accord with the spirit and purpose of the federal extradition
provisions which the state laws implement. Complete interstate
cooperation is essential if criminal extradition is to be fully
effective.
The defendant's right to a preliminary examination, although
frequently unenforced, is an important protection against high-
handed police procedures and third degree methods. It brings
defense counsel into the picture - implementing the constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination and the right to bail.
Other legal rights come into play, placing a check on this likely
area of "official lawlessness."' 9 The inadequate preliminary ex-
amination provisions of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure20 should be supplemented by the clear and complete state-
ment of preliminary examination procedures, as found in the
American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure.2 1
In revising the Preliminary Examination Chapter the pres-
ent basic nature and methods 22 should be preserved, but the more
complete procedural pattern of the ALI Code should be consid-
ered. A number of important rights of the defendant, which are
either omitted or only partially covered by the Louisiana pro-
visions, are clearly and simply stated in the ALI Code. A few of
these will be briefly mentioned. Under neither Code may the de-
state has resulted in a crime in the state seeking extradition. Here, the traditional
notion of a "fugitive from justice," as stated in LA. R.S. 15:160 (1950) is not
clearly met.
16. Section 5 of the Uniform Act authorizes extradition of persons who leave
the demanding state under compulsion, and also provides for reextradition agree-
ments when a local offender is delivered to another state for trial.
17. Uniform Crim. Extradition Act, 9 U.L.A. § 2 (1951).
18. LA. R.S. 15:160 (1950).
19. Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3
U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 357 (1936).
20. LA. R.S. 15:153-159 (1950).
21. ALI, CODE OF CRIM. PROC. §§ 39-60 (1930).
22. Presently found in cumbersomely phrased LA. R.S. 15:155 (1950).
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fendant be required to testify at the preliminary examination,
but the ALI Code is more specific in enunciating the rights of
the accused and requiring the committing magistrate to inform
him of those rights.23 The ALI Code limits postponements of the
preliminary examination to a total of six days, except for good
cause shown.2 4 The rights of confrontation and cross-examina-
tion of witnesses at the preliminary examination are clearly
spelled out in the ALI Code25 and the Federal Rules.20 These
rights are important, for matters of grave concern to the de-
fendant are determined at this stage of the proceedings. The
ALI rules as to the taking of explanatory statements of the ac-
cused 27 and as to the subsequent admissability of testimony of
witnesses at the preliminary examination, 28 provide a much
clearer and more flexible procedure than the present Louisiana
article.2 9 The effects of commitment" or discharge,'31 after the
preliminary hearing, are much more clearly and effectively set-
tled in the ALI Code. The ALI Code includes a special "harmless
error" provision, prohibiting the discharge of a defendant on a
writ of habeas corpus, and the invalidation of a preliminary ex-
amination "because of any informality or error, which does not
prejudice the [accused] in the commitment or the proceedings
prior thereto. '3 2 In commenting upon this provision, Orfield
states: "It would seem that the disregard of technical errors,
particularly at a preliminary proceeding is desirable. Non-preju-
dicial errors should not prevent the holding of a defendant for
trial before a jury on the merits." 33 The Louisiana harmless
error provision, as to trial irregularities, 3 4 does not apply to
prejudicial errors in connection with the preliminary examina-
tion.
23. Cf. LA. R.S. 15:155 (1950) ; ALI, CODE OF CRIt. PROC. § 47 (1930).
24. ALI, CODE OF CRIM. PROC. §43 (1930) ; cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c), requir-
ing that the hearing be held "within a reasonable time."
25. ALI, CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 46 (1930). Under Sections 287-291 the de-
fendant's presence is not jurisdictional and may be waived.
26. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c).
27. ALI, CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 47 (1930) provides for taking an unsworn
statement of the accused, as well as a deposition, where he desires to explain the
facts appearing against him.
28. Id. § 53(2) broadly provides for admissibility at the trial of testimony of
witnesses at the preliminary examination, "if, for any reason the testimony of
the witness cannot be obtained at the trial and the court is satisfied that the inabil-
ity to produce such testimony is not due to the fault of the party offering it."
29. LA. R.S. 15:155 (1950).
30. ALI, CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 117 (1930).
31. Id. § 116.
32. Id. § 60.
33. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 53 (1947).
34. LA. R.S. 15:557 (1950).
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In conformity with the general practice in the United States,
Louisiana's preliminary examination is open to the public. In
Canada the magistrate may exclude the public from a prelimi-
nary hearing, but the power is seldom exercised.35 There is much
to be said for the Canadian rule which permits exclusion of the
public in appropriately delicate situations, thus avoiding harm-
ful publicity and the confusion incidental to a public hearing. It
must be remembered that the preliminary examination is not a
"trial," but is usually held to determine the propriety of bringing
the accused to trial.
Bail is required for the purpose of obtaining reasonable as-
surance that the accused will appear for trial, but by a method
that will avoid the unnecessary incarceration of a person who
may ultimately be proven innocent. Subject to the general prin-
ciples of Louisiana's constitutional guaranty of bail, 6 bail pro-
cedures are set out in the Code of Criminal Procedure.87 The
Louisiana constitutional guaranty of the right to bail expressly
excepts capital cases "where the proof is evident or the presump-
tion great,"88 i.e., where a real prima facie case of guilt exists.
The general American jurisprudence is in conflict as to the effect
of an indictment with respect to this exception.8" On this issue,
and solely for the purpose of determining whether bail shall be
denied, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that "the fact that
the grand jury have found a bill for a capital offense is general-
ly considered a presumption of guilt sufficiently strong to shut
out any further inquiry into the merits of his defense, . . . ex-
cept upon the suggestion of circumstances of the most special
and extraordinary character. ' 40 The ALI Code provides that
after indictment of the accused "the burden is on such person
to show that proof is not evident or the presumption not great.141
Possibly the Louisiana Code should specifically deal with this
problem, and the ALI rebuttable presumption may be an ap-
propriate solution.
85. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 87 (1947). Orfield suggests that possibly
press reports of the evidence at preliminary hearings should be completely for-
bidden. Id. at 88.
36. LA. CONST. art. I, § 12 provides that: "All persons shall be bailable by
sufficient sureties, except the following: Persons charged with a capital offense,
where the proof is evident or the presumption great. Persons convicted of felonies,
provided that where a minimum sentence of less than five years at hard labor is
actually imposed, bail shall be allowed pending appeal until final judgment."
37. LA. R.S. 15:85-112 (1950).
38. LA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
39. ORFIxr.n, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 107 (1947).
40. State em rel. Hunter v. Brewster, 35 La. Ann. 605, 607 (1883).
41. ALI, CODE OF CRIM. PaOC. § 68(2) (1930).
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Bail pending 8entence is not adequately provided for by the
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Eugene Stanley has
pointed out this hiatus in the law :2 "There is no provision in
our law which provides for the release of a defendant on bail
after conviction and before sentence, and the question which nat-
urally arises is whether the defendant must be remanded in the
custody of the sheriff to await sentence, or whether he is entitled
to be released on bond. If he is entitled to be released on bond,
does the first bond still prevail or must he give a new bond?
There has been a difference of opinion amongst judges on this
matter." Without purporting to offer a solution for the prob-
lem, Mr. Stanley further states that this is a situation "which
should be clarified and straightened out by proper legislation."
One possible solution would be to specify a right to bail pending
sentence, in convictions of minor crimes where the maximum
sentence would not result in a denial of bail.
The fixing of bail is a judicial function, and the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure directs that bail must be specially
fixed in each case. 43 Recognizing the importance of having bail
immediately available for those charged with minor offenses, a
special provision authorizes release under bond of those charged
with misdemeanors or violations of city ordinances in city courts
"by the principal and his surety both waiving the fixing of bond
by the presiding judge," or any other irregularities in the bail
proceedings. 4 4 This enables the city judge to establish a regular
list of bonds for minor offenses, which may be administered by
the police officers on duty. Possible extension of this provision
to those charged with misdemeanors in district courts should be
considered. 45
The financial responsibility of sureties on bail bonds is of
utmost importance. The "straw" bondsman, such as the surety
who was accepted for $269,500 of bail bonds although his only
property was a $6,750 equity in an apartment building, 6 pro-
vides little assurance that those bonded will appear for trial. At
the same time a rigid requirement of cash bail would often work
a great hardship. Various requirements, such as a listing and
42. 33 LA. STATE BAR ASS'N REP. 25, 26 (1934).
43. LA. R.S. 15:92 (1950).
44. Id. 15:86.2.
45. See Criminal Law Reform Committee, The Setting of Bail in Minor Crim-
inal Cases, 17 LAWYERS Gunm REv. 148 (1957), raising a general query as to
the propriety of general release without bail in misdemeanor cases, but making no
definitive findings or recommendations.
46. Oam~na, CRIMINAL PRocEauaE 119, n. 71 (1947).
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legal description of the bondsman's property, and of other bonds
given, would help in determining whether the bond proffered
represents real security.47 One suggestion is a requirement that
the bond be secured by a lien on specific real estate having a net
value over other liens sufficient to secure the bond.48 This would
insure collectibility and would expedite collection of forfeited
bonds, but its administration would be fraught with practical
difficulties. Probably the most workable device for enhancing
enforcibility of the surety's obligation is the ALI Code provision
that the undertaking shall be a lien on all real property described
in the surety's affidavit from the time of its recording in the
county (parish) where the property is situated. 49 This prevents
sale of the property as a means of preventing collection. The
ALI Code includes other safeguards concerning the financial re-
sponsibility of the surety. 50 It also establishes a procedure for
collection of bail bonds, 51 which is somewhat simpler and more
direct than Louisiana's present procedure. 2
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure deals separately
with the drawing and selecting of jurors in Orleans Parish 8 and
in other parishes throughout the state.5 4 This dual classification
is subject to serious practical objections. First, many of the dif-
ferences cannot be rationalized upon the basis of a difference in
the size or nature of the communities. For example, a uniform
state-wide rule could govern such matters as selection of the jury
commissioners,5 5 the method of determining the names to be
placed on the grand jury list, and the method of selecting or
drawing the grand jury. Other matters, such as the size of jury
venires, must necessarily vary according to the size of the parish.
Here, population classifications may be the solution but the pres-
ent dual classification is hardly adequate. There are population
differences, presently not fully recognized, between sparsely
populated rural parishes and urban areas like East Baton Rouge
47. MINNESOTA CRIME COMMISSION REPORT 35, 65-66 (1927).
48. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 121 (1947).
49. ALI, CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 102 (1930). No such lien is provided by the
Louisiana Code or by the Federal Rules.
50. Id. §§ 78, 79. Cf. LA. R.S. 15:103, 104 (1950), providing less complete
protection.
51. ALI, CODE OF CRIM. PROC. §§ 103-105 (1930). Accord: FED. R. CRIM. P.
46(f) (3) (1946).
52. LA. R.S. 15:108 (1950).
53. Id. 15:191-201.
54. Id. .15 :175-190.
55. See VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 545,
547 (1949), discussing July 1938 recommendations of the American Bar Asso-
ciation.
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and Caddo Parishes. A complete classification, based upon these
population differences, would yield more than two classes - pos-
sibly three or four. In determining this question the statutes of
California,56 Illinois, 57 Massachusetts, 58 Missouri,59 and Utah 0
will be most helpful. Possibly the best answer to the problem
may rest in a flexible rule giving the district judge a blanket dis-
cretion to determine the number of names needed on the general
venire and petit jury lists.61
The time for urging objections to the method of select-
ing jurors, or irregularities in jury venires is governed by Ar-
ticle 202 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. 2 This
article, apparently aimed at insuring prompt objections to jury
lists or venires has been a continuous source of difficulty and
confusion. It was first interpreted in State v. Smothers 3 as re-
quiring a defendant to object to petit jury venires no later than
the third judicial day of the term for which it was drawn count-
ing from the beginning of the term. It was there suggested that,
where the defendant had been indicted or allegedly committed a
crime after that time, Article 202 might not be applicable, and
the general articles concerning the motion to quash would con-
trol. Later cases, starting with State v. Wilson,6 4 have inter-
preted the article to mean that objections to the jury list or
venire must be raised within three judicial days after the expira-
tion of the jury term, or before trial, whichever is sooner. Space
does not permit a detailed analysis of these decisions. Suffice it
to say that neither has offered a workable solution of the prob-
lem. Much of the difficulty in connection with Article 202 stems
from the fact that it purports to state a single general rule con-
56. CALIF. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 204 (Deering 1953). The judges of the vari-
ous districts recommend the number of veniremen needed for the next year.
57. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 78, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1941) requires a list of not less
than one-tenth the legal voters of each town or precinct in the county.
58. MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 234, § 4 (1931). Not less than one juror is chosen
per hundred inhabitants nor more than one juror per sixty inhabitants.
59. Mo. STAT. ANN. §§ 494-498 (Vernon 1950) solves the problem by making
three population classifications.
60. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-18 (1953) taking four names for every hundred
votes cast in the prior general election, but not less than seventy-five.
61. See note 56 supra.
62. "Art. 202. All objections to the manner of selecting or drawing any juror
or jury or to any defect or irregularity that can be pleaded against any array or
venire must be filed, pleaded, heard, or urged before the expiration of the third
judicial day of the term for which said jury shall have been drawn, or before
entering upon the trial of the case if it be begun sooner; otherwise all such objec-
tions shall be considered as waived and shall not afterwards be urged or heard."
(Emphasis added.)
63. 168 La. 1099, 123 So. 781 (1929).
64. 204 La. 24, 14 So.2d 873 (1943).
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cerning the proper time to object to both grand and petit jury
lists and venires. The timeliness of objections to the members or
composition of these two bodies involves special considerations
for each. The problem can best be solved by drafting separate
articles - one dealing with the time for filing objections to the
drawing and selecton of grand jurors, and one stating the time
for challenging petit jury lists and venires6 5 The ALI Code
treats these matters separately. A challenge of either an individ-
ual grand juror or the panel may be made by the state or a
"person who has been held to answer" for a crime at any time
before the jury or juror is sworn. 66 This provision for pre-indict-
ment challenge of grand jurors benefits the state as well as the
defense. It empowers an alert district attorney to protect his
indictments by challenging prospective grand jurors who are dis-
qualified, or challenging an illegally constituted jury panel at an
early stage in the proceedings, rather than being forced to wait
and have these questions determined by defense counsel's motion
to quash. Special provision is made for the defendant who had
not been "held to answer at the time the grand jurors were
sworn." He may urge a ground for a challenge of the panel or
of an individual grand juror by a motion to quash the indict-
ment.6 7 In separate articles dealing with challenges of petit jury
panels, the ALI Code simply provides that this objection must
be made before any individual juror is examined. 68
The effect of subsequent disqualification of one or more of
the grand jurors returning an indictment is not settled in Louisi-
ana law, either by the Code or the jurisprudence. It is very likely
that if it is found that one of the grand jurors was "not qualified
by law," an indictment returned by the defectively constituted
grand jury would be subject to a motion to quash.69 This matter
should be clarified. Both the Federal Rules 70 and the Uniform
Rules of Criminal Procedure7 1 provide that the number of votes
in favor of an indictment be endorsed on the indictment, and
that in case of subsequent disqualification of one or more of the
65. Comment, Time for Urging Objeotion8 to Jury Liats and Venires, 15 Lou-
ISIANA LAw REVIEW 749 (1955).
66. ALI, CODE OF CRIM. PRO. §§ 118-120 (1930). Accord: FED. R. CRIM. P.
6(b), also allowing the judge discretion to accept the motion for a reasonable time
after the plea has been entered.
67. ALI, CODE OF CRI. PROO. § 210 (1930).
68. Id. §§ 268, 269.
69. LA. R.S. 15:203 (last sentence) (1950).
70. FED. R. Cam. PRoc. 6(b) (c).
71. UNIFORM RULES OF CalM. PROc. 8(b), 9.
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grand jurors, the indictment shall not be invalidated if there are
still enough positive votes to sustain it.
Proper rules as to the form of indictments is a matter which
commands high priority in a revision of Louisiana's Code of
Criminal Procedure. In early English law the strict construction
of indictments was decried by Sir Matthew Hale as a "blemish
and inconvenience in the law" which enabled "more offenders
[to] escape by the over easy ear given to exceptions in indict-
ments, than by their own innocence. ' 72 Despite statutory efforts
to minimize this problem, the technical requirements of framing
sufficient indictments still present many perplexing and contro-
versial questions.78 The drafting of proper rules as to the form
of indictments will call for a careful study of the statutory re-
forms enacted by other states, and those proposed by the ALI
Code and Uniform Rules. It will also necessitate a thorough re-
view of our Louisiana jurisprudence, for it is important to pro-
vide indictment forms and rules which will comply with the con-
stitutional right of the accused to "be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.17 4
The short form indictment, authorized by Article 235 of the
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure,75 and by Section 188 of
the ALI Code, provides effective relief, as to the crimes included,
from the technicalities of the old common law indictment rules.
The basic function of the "short form" indictment is to inform
the accused of the crime charged, reserving a recital of the de-
tails of the offense for the bill of particulars which is not sub-
ject to the same strict construction as the indictment. This pre-
cludes use of the indictment as a vehicle for a battle of wits
between the draftsman and defense counsel who seek to check-
mate the state by reason of some inadvertent and often highly
technical omission. While jurisprudence from other states has
almost universally upheld the validity of the short form indict-
ment,7 6 its use is subject to certain constitutional limitations.
Consideration of the "short form" indictment problem must in-
clude a careful analysis of the Louisiana jurisprudence, and
especially Chief Justice Fournet's thorough and scholarly dis-
72. HALE, HISTORY OF PLEAS TO THE CRwWN 193 (1st American ed. 1847).
73. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 218-21 (1947).
74. LA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
75. LA. R.S. 15:235 (1950).
76. Comment, The Short Form Indictment -History, Development and Con.
stitutionality, 6 LouISIANA LAw REVIEw 78 (1944).
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cussion of the problem in State v. Straughan.77 Prior to that
decision the Louisiana Supreme Court had upheld short form
indictments for murder,7 manslaughter,7 9 theft,80 and aggra-
vated rape.8 ' It is significant that while all of these offenses
could be committed in several ways, they were crimes having a
well-understood meaning and scope. A 1944 amendment of Ar-
ticle 235 extended the short forms to all Criminal Code crimes,
providing that it would "be sufficient to charge the defendant
by using the name and article number of the offense com-
mitted." In the Straughan case an indictment, drawn pursuant
to the 1944 amendment, sought to charge the multifarious and
purely statutory crime of gambling by name and article number.
This was held to be insufficient. The full import of the Straughan
decision must be carefully studied, for it is important to provide
indictment forms that are reasonably certain to meet the test of
constitutionality laid down therein. The Supreme Court has defi-
nitely held that purely statutory offenses covering multiple
forms of criminal conduct, such as gambling or obscenity, can-
not be charged by name and article number. However, the re-
cent case of State v. Elias82 clearly shows that it will continue to
sustain the validity of specific short forms for well-understood
crimes.
The formulation of a clear long-form indictment rule is essen-
tial, regardless of the decision as to short forms. These regular
indictment forms will be used for a majority of Criminal Code
crimes and for all crimes not found in the Criminal Code, as
for violations of the narcotics and election laws. The long-form
indictment rule should be so stated as to protect fully the rights
of the accused, but without serving as a trap for the prosecution.
The requirement of Article 227 of the Louisiana Code that "the
indictment must state every fact and circumstance necessary to
constitute the offense" has occasionally been interpreted so as
virtually to require a spelling out of the details of the crime.83
77. 229 La. 1036, 87 So.2d 523 (1956).
78. State v. White, 172 La. 1045, 136 So. 47 (1931).
79. State v. Nichols, 216 La. 622, 44 So.2d 318 (1950).
80. State v. Pete, 206 La. 1078, 20 So.2d 368 (1944).
81. State v. Chanet, 209 La. 410, 24 So.2d 670 (1946).
82. 99 So.2d 1 (La. 1958), upholding short form charge of attempted murder.
83. In State v. Kelly, 225 La. 495, 503, 73 So.2d 437, 439 (1954), an indict-
ment for false registration of voters was held insufficient for failure to specify
the nature of the false information which formed the basis of the charge. Justice
McCaleb's dissent pointed out that the type of false registration had been stated,
and that details as to the specific information submitted were obtainable through
a bill of particulars.
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Possibly the article should be recast in the light of Rule 7(c)
of the Federal Rules which states: "The indictment or informa-
tion shall be a plain and concise written statement of the essen-
tial facts constituting the offense charged." The English Indict-
ments Act 84 and the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure8 5
similarly stress the idea that the essential facts shall be set
out in the indictment, but that the details of the criminal conduct
are to be furnished in the bill of particulars.8 6
Allegation of prior convictions under the habitual offender
law raises a practical problem which does not appear effectively
solved by either the AL187 or Louisiana 8 Code provisions. The
accused is entitled to notice that he is to be charged as a multiple
offender, where the state has such information at the time of the
trial. At the same time the allegation of prior convictions should
not be submitted to the jury before they return their verdict as
to the crime presently charged. A study of other recently enacted
Codes of Criminal Procedure may suggest an answer to this
question.
Citation of the statute alleged to have been violated by the
defendant is not required by the ALI or Louisiana rules govern-
ing indictment forms. The Federal Rules require a citation of
the statute violated, but logically add: "Error in the citation or
its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment
or information or for reversal of a conviction if the error or
omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice."8 9 Such
a provision is rendered desirable by the ever-increasing num-
ber and complexity of crimes and penal provisions in general
statutes. "To know the statute may be as important as to know
the facts intended to be proved." 90
Joinder of offenses has a rather extensive legislative and
judicial history in Louisiana. Article 218 of the 1928 Code of
Criminal Procedure provided for mandatory joinder "when two
or more crimes result from a single act, or from one continuous
unlawful transaction." After considerable litigation concerning
its constitutionality, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided that
84. 5 & 6 GEO. V, c. 90, § 3 (1915).
85. UNIFORM RULES OF CRIM. PROC. 16 (1952).
86. The bill of particulars is authorized under LA. R.S. 15:288 (1950) and
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7 (f).
87. ALI, CODE OF CRIM. PRoC. § 172 (1930).
88. LA. R.S. 15:242 (1950).
89. FED. R. CRrm. P. 7(c).
90. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 258 (1947).
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Article 218 was unconstitutional insofar as it provided for a
joinder of offenses triable by different types of juries, but was
valid insofar as it authorized the joinder of offenses having
the same method of trial and appeal. 91 In 1932, a year later, the
Legislature repealed Article 218. The repeal was probably moti-
vated by an objection to the mandatory nature of the provision
which stated that where several crimes arise out of a single
transaction "only one indictment will lie," (the joinder rule
established in prior Louisiana jurisprudence had been permis-
sive), and by a confusion engendered by the partial unconstitu-
tionality of the article. With the repeal of Article 218, the
general prohibition of Article 217 is controlling and precludes
joinder of crimes arising out of the same transaction, even where
they are subject to the same method of trial and appeal. 92 Most
states, either by decision or statute, provide for the joinder of
two or more crimes in a single indictment. These rules take
various forms - some place stress upon the similarity of the
crimes charged 3 and others allow joinder of offenses connected
together in their commission. 94 The federal joinder rule includes
both elements.95 It provides for permissive, rather than man-
datory, joinder. The American Law Institute deals with the
joinder problem in its Model Penal Code, which provides for
mandatory joinder, with only a single prosecution, where two
or more offenses are based on the same conduct, based on a
series of acts motivated by a single criminal objective, or affect
the same person or his property.96 The court is specifically em-
powered to order separate trials when "it is satisfied that justice
so requires. '97 In support of the Model Penal Code provision for
mandatory joinder, the ALI Reporter states that it "is designed
to prevent the state from bringing successive prosecutions based
upon essentially the same conduct, whether the purpose in so
doing is to hedge the risk of an unsympathetic jury at the first
trial, to place a 'hold' upon a person after he has been sentenced
to imprisonment, or simply to harass by a multiplicity of
trials."98 In favor of a broad joinder rule are the arguments
91. State v. White, 172 La. 1045, 136 So. 47 (1931).
92. State v. Carter, 206 La. 181, 19 So.2d 41 (1944).
93. Simmons v. State, 165 Md. 155, 167 At!. 60 (1933) (joinder of nine lar-
cenies). Authorization of this type of joinder is strongly recommended in a mem-
orandum written by Judge William O'Hara to the author, dated April 29, 1957.
94. WASH. REV. STAT. § 2059 (Remington 1927).
95. FED. R. CRam. PRoo. 8(a).
96. ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 5, § 1.08(2) (1956).
97. Id. § 1.08(3).
98. Id. at 34.
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of trial convenience and that it is best to have a single jury
consider the entire picture of the defendant's alleged criminal
conduct. In favor of a strict joinder rule that an indictment
must charge a single offense is the argument that where several
crimes are charged juries are likely to use evidence in support
of one charge to convict on another charge not independently
or adequately proved. Whether there shall be joinder of common
crimes, the grounds for such joinder, and whether joinder shall
be permissive or mandatory, present questions of policy which
must be determined in advance of the actual drafting of these
provisions. In view of Louisiana's constitutional provisions as
to different types of tribunals for serious felonies, relative
felonies, and misdemeanors, joinder must necessarily be limited
to crimes having the same method of trial and appeal.99
Objections to indictments should be waived unless they are
raised seasonably. A defendant should not be permitted to delay
his objection until after the trial, as a sort of anchor to wind-
ward in case of conviction. Article 253 of the Louisiana Code
of Criminal Procedure provides, along with many other things,
that "no indictment shall be quashed ... , nor shall any convic-
tion be set aside or reversed on account of any defect in form
or substance of the indictment, unless the objection to such in-
dictment, specifically stating the defect claimed, be made prior
to the commencement of the trial or at such time thereafter as
the court in its discretion permit." (Emphasis added.) 100 The
words "or substance" have been virtually read out of Article 253
by the Supreme Court's holding in State v. McDonald,1' 1 that a
substantial defect in a burglary indictment, which failed to al-
lege that "a building" had been burglarized, could be raised for
the first time by a motion in arrest of judgment. Article 253
might be restated so as to make it doubly clear that defects of
substance must be urged "prior to commencement of the trial
or at such time thereafter as the court in its discretion permit";
or Louisiana might adopt the ALI Code solution of the delayed
objection problem, by providing that no defect or variance can
be taken advantage of after verdict "unless it is affirmatively
shown that the defendant was in fact prejudiced thereby in his
defense upon the merits.' 0 2
99. Comment, Joinder of Criminal Offenses in Louisiana, 4 LOUISIANA LAW
REviEw 127 (1941).
100. LA. R.S. 15:253 (1950).
101. 178 La. 612, 152 So. 308 (1934).
102. ALI, CoDz or CaIm. Poc. § 184(4) (1930).
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Louisiana's present statutory provisions as to process upon
the indictment leave much to be desired. These matters were
not covered in the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure, and the
provision that defendants indicted for major felonies shall be
furnished with a copy of the indictment and jury list at least
two days before trial comes from an unrepealed provision of
the Revised Statutes of 1870 which was integrated in the 1950
Revision.10 3 Furnishing a copy of the indictment two days be-
fore trial does not assure the defendant of an opportunity to
study the indictment prior to the arraignment. In this regard
the ALI Code provides that a copy of the indictment shall be
furnished the defendant "at least twenty four hours before he
is required to plead thereto."'01 4 Fortunately, current Louisiana
practices conform with the ALI procedure.
Louisiana's requirement of delivery of the jury list to the
defendant before trial raises practical difficulties. Judge Wil-
liam J. O'Hara has made a special study of this problem. In a
memorandum to the writer'0 5 he stated, in part: "This provi-
sion, which means absolutely nothing to the defendant except to
give him a legal cause for a continuance if the personal service
is not made, is a serious burden upon the courts and the sheriff's
office." After summarizing the laws of other states, Judge
O'Hara concluded, "It it my opinion that it would be a great
boon to the sheriffs of all the parishes of the state if this law
was rewritten to place the burden upon the defendant or his
attorney to secure a copy of the jury list if they wished to have
one. . . .The law could be kept as it is in capital cases only."
The defendant's right to investigate the character and back-
ground of prospective jurors is amply protected by the provi-
sion for publication of the jury lists.10 6 It might be further im-
plemented, as suggested by Judge O'Hara, by giving the defend-
ant a right to secure a copy of the jury list upon request. The
ALI Code, which appears very solicitious of the rights of the
accused, does not provide for service of the petit jury list upon
defendants.
The names of the witnesses who will probably be called
against him at the trial is information in which the defendant
has a legitimate interest. The ALI Code provides that the names
103. LA. R.S. 15:332.1 (1950).
104. ALI, CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 193 (1930).
105. Dated April 29, 1957.
106. LA. R.S. 15:183 (1950).
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of witnesses examined by the grand jury shall be endorsed on
the indictment, and further stipulates that court rules may pro-
vide for the furnishing of names of such other witnesses as the
state proposes to call. 10 7 Ample safeguards are included, so that
the failure to endorse witnesses' names will not invalidate an
otherwise sufficient indictment or information. The strongest-
objection to such a requirement is the fact that the defendant
is not under a reciprocal duty to acquaint the state of his wit-
nesses - the proffered information being a one-way proposition.
It has also been suggested that there is a possibility of intimida-
tion of witnesses, and that most district attorneys voluntarily
furnish such information to reputable defense counsel. On the
other hand, the accused can hardly be said to have been fully
informed of the nature of the cause against him if the state's
witnesses and proof are kept a deep, dark secret. Summarizing
persuasive authority in support of the ALI rule forcing the state
to put all its cards on the table, Orfield states that the rule is
reported to have worked well in most states having it and is
favored by the Wickersham Commission. Wigmore considers its
omission a great injustice. 0 8
One of the more significant innovations in the ALI Code is
the all-embracive motion to quash.0 9 Demurrers and all special
pleas, such as pleas of former jeopardy, improper venue, and
prescription, are expressly abolished. All defenses formerly
available under these pleas are specifically covered by the "mo-
tion to quash." 110 This simplified handling of preliminary ob-
jections to the charge has many advantages over the multi-
labeled pleas of the Louisiana Code. Louisiana's "demurrer,"' 111
for example, serves no useful purpose for the same objection
may also be raised by a motion to quash for a "defect apparent
upon the face of the indictment." 112 Prescription and lack of
jurisdiction are sometimes raised by special plea. In other cases
they are urged as a ground for a motion to quash the indictment.
There is no good reason why former jeopardy must be raised
by a special plea to the merits." 3 It can best be treated as a
107. ALI, CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 194 (1930).
108. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 257 (1947).
109. ALI, CODE OF CRIM. PROC. §§ 209, 210 (1930). Accord: FED. R. CRIM. P.
12(a) (motion to dismiss).
110. ALI, CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 210 (1930).





preliminary plea, as are prescription and improper venue or
lack of jurisdiction. The ALI motion to quash also embraces
the situation where the bill of particulars furnishes insufficient
information or states facts which "do not constitute the offense
charged in the indictment." These situations are not adequately
dealt with in the Louisiana Code.114
The time for filing objections to the indictment is confusingly
stated in the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 284
states the general rule that "every objection to any indictment
shall be taken by demurrer or by motion to quash such indict-
ment, before the arraignment." (Emphasis added.) As a prac-
tical matter, this provision is interpreted to mean that the mo-
tion to quash is a preliminary motion which must be filed before
the defendant pleads to the merits at the arraignment. Article
288 provides that "defects in indictments can be urged before
verdict only by demurrer or a motion to quash." (Emphasis
added.) This provision contemplates the situation where the
court may, in its discretion, permit the defendant to withdraw
his plea of not guilty and move to quash the indictment or set
up some other plea.1 5 Articles 284 and 288 should be redrafted
so as to provide a clear and complete statement of the time at
which the motion to quash is to be filed. The Federal Rules
state, in a very direct manner, that the preliminary motion
"shall be made before the plea is entered, but the court may
permit it to be made within a reasonable time thereafter. '"" 6
The ALI Code has a very flexible, and clearly stated, procedure.
The defendant may "either move to quash the indictment or
information or plead thereto, or do both. If he moves to quash,
without also pleading, and the motion is withdrawn or overruled
he shall immediately plead.""11 7
The method of urging the defense of insanity at the time of
the crime has been a source of much legislative and judicial
114. The Louisiana Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the motion to
quash so as to afford a measure of relief in such cases. State v. Masino, 214 La.
744, 38 So.2d 622 (1949), wherein Justice Moise, being hard put to formulate the
precise theory of a very sound decision, aptly declared: "It is easier to find fault
with a remedy proposed than to propose a remedy that is faultless." Id. at 748,
38 So.2d at 623. The Masino decision would have been easily and logically sus-
tained under Section 210(1) (e) of the ALI Code.
115. LA. R.S. 15:265 (1950); State v. Verdin, 192 La. 275, 187 So. 666
(1939), holding that it is reversible error for the trial judge to refuse to permit
a change of plea where there is a valid basis for the motion to quash and an
excuse for the delay in urging it, such as lack of counsel at the arraignment.
116. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3).
117. ALI, CODE OF CaIM. PROC. § 207.
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concern. Prior to the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure, Lou-
isiana had followed the common law procedure whereby the
insanity defense, along with all other defenses to the merits,
could be raised under a general plea of not guilty. This com-
mingling of the insanity issue with other basic guilt issues fre-
quently resulted in jury confusion. The Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure sought to avoid this difficulty, by establishing "insanity
at the time of the crime" as a separate defense on the merits
which must be set up by a special plea.118 It further directed
that such defense "shall be filed, tried and disposed of prior to
any trial of the plea of not guilty, and no evidence of insanity
shall be admissible upon the trial of the plea of not guilty.'" 11 9
This new procedure contemplated a separate trial of the insanity
defense and virtually necessitated the impaneling of two juries.
The first jury would determine the insanity plea, that is, whether
the defendant was criminally responsible for his action. If they
found him sane, a second jury would be impaneled to determine
whether he had committed the crime charged. This created a
serious problem in the smaller parishes where jury venires were
barely adequate to provide one twelve-man jury for sensational
murder and rape trials. In an effort to avoid the necessity of
dual juries, a 1932 statute 20 deleted the requirement that the
insanity plea be tried and disposed of prior to the plea of "not
guilty." However, insanity was still listed as a separate plea,
and the amendatory statute provided no substitute for the pro-
cedure eliminated - it did not state when the plea of insanity
was to be raised or how it was to be handled. During the past
twenty-five years the procedure has become rather well set by
a series of judicial decisions, but the results remain somewhat
anomalous. If the defendant simply pleads "not guilty," evidence
of insanity at the time of the crime is inadmissible.' 21 However,
if he pleads "not guilty by reason of insanity," the door is wide
open and all defenses may be urged simultaneously. Evidence is
then admissible to show that the defendant did not commit the
act, that he was justified as by self defense, and that he was not
118. LA. R.S. 15:261 (1950).
119. LA. CODE OF CaIM. PRoc. art. 267 (1928). In explaining this change the
Code Commissioners stated: "It is thought that the provisions on this subject will
result in determining the issue of insanity vel non before the trial on the merits,
thereby minimizing the abuses which often arise from the use of the plea of in-
sanity." LA. CRI. STAT. 562 (Dart 1932).
120. La. Acts 1932, No. 136, amending LA. CODE OF CRIM. PRoc. art. 267
(1928) .
121. State v. Gunter, 208 La. 694, 23 So.2d 305 (1945).
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responsible by reason of insanity. Even where defendant wants
it, he cannot demand a separate trial of his insanity plea.122
If it is desirable to keep the insanity defense separate from
the general "not guilty" plea, a practical solution may be found
in the California procedure.'2 3 California reverses the order of
trial where insanity is pleaded, and provides that the jury shall
first determine if the defendant committed the crime charged.
Then, if the defendant is found to have committed the crime,
the same jury passes upon the separate insanity defense. With
this order of trial the jury's judgment in determining the initial
question of guilt or innocence is not colored by the insanity evi-
dence.
Probably the greatest evil of commingling the insanity plea
and other defenses is the surprise insanity defense which is
raised for the first time during the trial. This may catch the
state by surprise and necessitate a continuance of the trial until
the next term of court. This is met under Louisiana's present
procedures by the requirement of a special plea of insanity. It
can be met in a much less confusing manner, assuming that
separate trial of the insanity issue is not considered essential
or practicable, by simply requiring advance notice of the inten-
tion to rely on insanity as a defense. This is the procedure fol-
lowed by the American Law Institute in its tentatively approved
draft of a Model Penal Code 124 and its Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure. 125
Similarly, notice of the defendant's intent to rely on an alibi
defense is presently required, either by statute or rule of court,
in fourteen states.12 6 Six of these states require the defendant
to furnish the names of his alibi witnesses. These statutes are
predicated on the idea that the prosecution should not be re-
quired to anticipate a possible alibi defense- a matter which
is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant. This argu-
ment is particularly persuasive if the new code should adopt an
122. State v. Dowdy, 217 La. 773, 47 So.2d 496 (1950).
123. CALIF. PEN. CODE § 1.010 (Deering 1949).
124. ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 4, § 4.03(2) (1955) : "Evi-
dence of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility shall not be admissible
unless the defendant at the time of entering his plea of not guilty or within ten
days thereafter or at such later time as the Court may for good cause permit files
a written notice of his purpose to rely on such defense."
125. ALI, CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 235 (1930).
126. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 311-14 (1947). Accord: WICKERSHAM
CRIME COMMISSION, REPORT ON CRIMINAL 'ROCEDURE 34, 47 (1931).
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"all cards on the table" principle by requiring the state to fur-
nish the defendant a list of its witnesses. The proposed Federal
Rules provided for notice of alibi,'127 but that provision was not
adopted by the Supreme Court in the final draft. The Uniform
Rules require notice of alibi, under penalty of such evidence
being inadmissible "unless the court for good cause shown orders
otherwise."12
8
The Louisiana prescription articles have been a source of
much difficulty and litigation. This was inevitable in view of
the fact that numerous different rules are embraced in two
cumbersomely phrased articles. Even one quite astute in law
cannot determine with any degree of certainty the applicability
and limitations of the various prescription periods set out in
these over-lapping provisions. Under Article 8 of the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure the indictment must be found or
the information filed within one year after the crime "shall have
been made known" to the judge, district attorney, or grand jury
having jurisdiction over the case. 129 The second prescriptive
period, confusingly set out in Articles 8 and 9,130 is a three-year
limitation on bringing felons to trial after they have been
charged. In non-felony cases the period is two years. It is gen-
erally agreed that a revision of these prescription rules is badly
needed, but the procedure to be followed involves a policy de-
cision. Should we retain the basic principles of the present Lou-
isiana prescriptive periods and redraft the articles so as to
clarify their operation and remove their inadequacies, or should
we abandon the present provisions as unworkable and adopt
rules similar to those stated in the American Law Institute Model
Penal Code' 81 or the federal statutes ?132 The most important
difference between the Louisiana and the ALI - Federal ap-
proaches to the prescription problem relates to the length of the
periods. The Louisiana Code provides for a short (one year)
prescription period on bringing the charge, which runs from the
time that the offense is known or should have been known to the
prosecuting authorities; coupled with a relatively long (3 years)
period for bringing the accused to trial. The ALI - Federal
rules provide a fairly long period, running from the date of the
127. Proposed Rule 16.
128. UNIFORM RULEs OF CRIM. PRoc. 26 (1952).
129. LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950).
130. Id. 15:8, 9.
131. ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 5, § 1.07 (1956).
132. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3281, 3282, 3288-3290 (1948).
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crime, within which the accused must be charged, coupled with a
relatively short period for bringing the accused to trial. Perhaps
the ultimate draft will incorporate the better features of each
system. Only a few of the more specific prescription problems
will be discussed.
The only non-prescribable crime under the ALI Model Penal
Code is murder.13 3 The federal prescription section excepts only
capital offenses. 134 In explaining the single exception of murder
as a non-prescribable crime, the ALI reporter stressed the de-
sirability of maintaining "the common police practice never to
close the files on an unsolved murder case," and "the long con-
tinued impact on the sense of general security of the commun-
ity.' 135 This argument would appear almost equally applicable
to aggravated rape, also a capital crime; but it would scarcely
apply to the other felonies listed in the Louisiana exception
clause as non-prescribable. There is even less justification for
allowing trial and conviction of such lesser crimes as man-
slaughter or simple rape where murder and aggravated rape
have been charged. Louisiana's novel provision, that permits
conviction of an otherwise prescribed lesser crime which is in-
cluded in the charge of a non-prescribable offense, 136 finds little
support either in logic or the law of other states.
The time when prescription starts to run upon the bringing
of a charge against the offender is a matter where Louisiana
differs from the ALI Model Penal Code. Only Louisiana137 and
Georgia"" provide that the period does not start to run until the
offense is known, or should have been discovered, by the ap-
propriate authorities. This may partially explain Louisiana's
unusually short period of one year. The ALI draft follows the
preponderant majority rule that the period of limitation starts
to run when the offense "is committed."'189 The principal objec-
tion that can be offered to the ALI rule is the possibility of con-
cealment of the offender's guilt. This is largely offset by the
greater length of the ALI and other similar prescription periods.
The basic justification of the longer limitation, beginning with
133. ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 5, § 1.07 (1956).
134. 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (1948).
135. ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 5, at 17 (Reporter's Com-
ment) (1956).
136. LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950).
137. Ibid.
138. GA. CODE § 27-601 (1933).
139. ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 5, § 1.07(2).
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the commission of the crime, rests upon the premise that after
a substantial period without further criminal activity, no worthy
social interest is served by bringing the offender before the
court and trying him for his previous crime. In such a case it
may be assumed that the offender has effected a self-rehabilita-
tion which will not be enhanced by his subsequent trial and im-
prisonment. Also, most offenses can be discovered by adequate
and prompt investigation. Realizing that there are certain of-
fenses where the opportunity for prolonged concealment is great,
as in fiduciary frauds of various types, special provision for
prosecution within one year after discovery of the crime is made
for those cases. 140 This represents a compromise of the conflict-
ing considerations underlying the present Louisiana and gen-
erally adopted views.
The provisions for tolling the running of the prescriptive
periods, partly stated in the last paragraph of Article 8 and
partly in Article 9 of the Louisiana Code, are confusing both
as to their applicability and meaning. The ALI Model Penal
Code provision' 4 1 may well serve as a pattern for a clear enuncia-
tion of the conditions of suspension of prescription.
Louisiana's three-year prescriptive period upon bringing the
accused to trial after the finding of the indictment is confusingly
stated, partly in Article 8 and partly in Article 9. The Bradley142
and Truett143 decisions pointed up some of the difficulties in-
herent in these overlapping provisions. In the Bradley case the
Supreme Court, in order to achieve a fair result, held that two
three-year prescriptive periods were created by these articles.
The holding was not without logical support from the involved
wording of the prescription articles, but achieved a result that
probably came as a surprise to the draftsmen of the 1928 Code.
The problems posed in the Bradley and Truett decisions can only
be solved by a clearly drafted article providing for a single pre-
scriptive period within which the accused must be brought to
trial. When this is done the length of the time limitation should
be much shorter than the present three-year period. In Mis-
souri the accused must be brought to trial before the end of the
second term of court after the indictment is returned. 14 In
140. Id. § 1.07(3).
141. Id. § 1.07(6).
142. 227 La. 421, 79 So.2d 561 (1955).
143. 230 La. 955, 89 So.2d 754 (1956).
144. Mo. STAT. ANN. §§ 545.890, 545.900 (Vernon 1950).
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Arizona the actual trial must begin within sixty days after the
formal charge. 145 The Federal Rules provide for dismissing the
indictment "if there is unnecessary delay in bringing the de-
fendant to trial."'1 46 The ALI Code of Criminal Procedure makes
no specific recommendation as to the length of the time limita-
tion upon bringing the accused to trial, leaving this decision to
the adopting states.14 T The length of time of this prescriptive
period will depend somewhat upon whether a long or short period
for bringing the formal charge is adopted.
Former jeopardy partakes of both substantive and procedural
law, and no hard and fast line can be drawn between the two.
Such questions as identity of crimes arising out of a single act
are basically substantive. The method and manner of raising
former jeopardy is clearly procedural. Other problems, coming
in the twilight zone, may properly be treated as either. The
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, in common with those
of many other jurisdictions, elected to cover these borderline
matters. The American Law Institute has included most of the
double jeopardy rules in its Model Penal Code (now in prepara-
tion) rather than in its Code of Criminal Procedure (published
in 1930). The revision should continue the present Louisiana
policy of providing the principal treatment of former jeopardy
in the Code of Criminal Procedure, but the carefully and fully
drafted provisions of the ALI Model Penal Code 148 should be
considered. They clarify a number of problems which are con-
fusingly or inadequately handled under present Louisiana law.
These include full statutory coverage of the situations where
prosecution is barred by a former prosecution for the same of-
fense. 149 For example, the Model Penal Code' 50 is much more
specific and complete than the Louisiana Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure' 51 in stating when the termination of a trial is "improper"
and will support a plea of former jeopardy. A sound innovation
of the Model Code is the provision that prosecution in another
state or federal court for the same criminal conduct shall be a
bar to a subsequent local prosecution. 1 52 In the absence of statute,
145. ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 44-1503 (1939).
146. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b).
147. ALI, CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 292 (1930).
148. ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 5, §§ 1.08-1.12 (1956).
149. Id. § 1.09.
150. Id. § 1.09(4).
151. LA. R.S. 15:278 (1950).
152. ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 5, § 1.11 (1956).
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the rule against double jeopardy does not apply between separate
sovereignties. 153
The territorial jurisdiction of Louisiana courts in criminal
cases is subject to a very limited control by legislative enact-
ment, for this state cannot, by pure legislative fiat, assume juris-
diction over crimes committed in other states. However, a state
may assume jurisdiction of criminal activity transpiring beyond
its boundaries where the effects of the action are felt within
the state. For example, Article 16 of the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure asserts local jurisdiction to prosecute for
homicide where the mortal blow is inflicted in another state,
and the homicide is consummated by the victim's death in Lou-
isiana.15 4 In this situation Louisiana has a sufficient interest in
the homicide to punish the defendant for an act committed out-
side the state. 15  However, a statute is necessary to show that
the state intends to exercise its fullest possible jurisdiction. The
ALI Model Penal Code, which provides a very comprehensive
coverage of this jurisdictional problem, 56 goes further than Lou-
isiana's Article 16. "If the body of the victim is found within
the state it is presumed that the victim died in the state. ' 157 This
takes care of the situation where a dead body is found in a
thicket or car trunk, but the time and place of the death are
impossible to ascertain. The Model Penal Code also makes special
provision for an attempt or conspiracy outside the state's terri-
tory that is aimed at the commission of a crime within the
state.158 This is a situation where existing statutes and prece-
dents are lacking. Since the security of the state is threatened
by such activity, the state has a sufficient interest to control and
punish such conduct.
The troublesome venue problem relating to the jurisdiction
of a particular district court was largely solved by a 1942 amend-
ment of Article 13 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure,
providing "that where the several acts constituting a crime shall
have been committed in more than one parish, the offender may
be tried in any parish where a substantial element of the crime
153. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
154. LA. R.S. 15:16 (1950).
155. Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 319 (1860), sustaining a similar Michigan
statute.
156. ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 5, § 1.03 (1956).
157. Id. §1.03(2) (f) (3).
158. Id. §1.03(1) (b), (c).
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has been committed." 15 9 There are still a few situations where,
because of the uncertainties of proof, special liberalized venue
provisions may be advisable. Where an offense, such as a homi-
cide, is committed on a vehicle which is travelling across several
parishes, it will sometimes be impossible to determine in which
parish the crime or a substantial element took place. The trial,
in such situations, should be authorized in any parish through
or over which the vehicle passed during such trip. 6 0 The local
homicide problem presented where the body is found in a parish,
but there is no way of determining the place of the fatal blow or
the death, should be covered by recognizing venue in the parish
where the body is found. 16'
The procedures for presenting and determining the insanity
defenses are confusingly handled in three cumbersomely phrased
and much-amended articles of the Louisiana Code. 12 The com-
position of the lunacy commission, which examines the accused
as to his present mental condition or as to his mental condition
at the time of the crime is probably the most serious inadequacy
in those procedures. A 1944 amendment'6 8 to the insanity ar-
ticles provides that the commission shall be composed of "dis-
interested physicians" whose sole qualification is that they must
have practiced medicine for three years. The mandatory inclu-
sion of the coroner added little to the prestige or capability of
the commission. Fortunately, psychiatrists from the state mental
hospital are usually appointed to serve on the lunacy commis-
sion. The 1944 statute, which eliminated the Code's original
requirement of trained and qualified psychiatrists, was not
prompted by a failure to appreciate the value of such testimony.
Rather, it was enacted to relieve parish police juries of the heavy
costs of obtaining such professional services. A sound solution
159. Accord: ALI, CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 242 (1930). See Comment, The
Resurrection and Constitutionality of a Liberal Criminal Venue Provision, 4 Lou-
ISIANA LAW REviEw 321 (1942).
160. See ALI, CODE OF Calm. PROC. § 239 (1930), providing for offenses com-
mitted in aircrafts, § 245 providing for offenses committed on a railroad train or
other vehicle, and § 246 providing for crimes committed on vessels. A single ar-
ticle covering venue of crimes committed during inter-parish transportation would
cover the entire problem.
161. CALIF. PENAL CODE § 790 (Deering 1949). See similar provision as to
interstate jurisdiction in ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 5,
§ 1.03(2) (f) (3) (1956).
162. LA. R.S. 15:267-269 (1950). Article 267 governs the procedure when the
defendant pleads present insanity as a bar to being brought to trial. Articles 268
and 269 set out the procedures to be followed when insanity at the time of the
crime is urged as a complete defense.
163. La. Acts 1944, No. 261.
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of this problem is suggested by the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code. 164 It provides for a mental examination by
"at least one qualified psychiatrist," and that the psychiatrist
or psychiatrists may be requested from the state mental hospital.
Such a provision would solve the financial problem of the small
parishes. It would also insure a report by a competent psychia-
trist, specializing in the characteristics of the criminally insane,
who would be completely free from either prosecution or defense
influence. This would probably necessitate the addition of one
or two psychiatrists to the presently overworked staffs of the
state mental hospitals, but that would be money well spent. One
of the soundest moves that can be made in securing an adequate
jury appreciation of the confusing insanity issues is to provide
a lunacy commission report which the jury will respect -a re-
port that will stand forth as an unbiased and competent analysis
of the mental condition of the accused. 6 5
The lunacy commission's report, where present insanity is
urged as a bar to trial under Louisiana's Article 267, covers only
the present mental condition of the accused. In this situation
the trial judge is not empowered to order a report on the de-
fendant's mental condition at the time of the crime. 6 6 Where a
defendant is found presently insane he is committed to an in-
stitution. Later, when he regains his mental powers, he is
brought to trial for his alleged crime. If insanity at the time of
the crime is then pleaded as a defense, a separate mental ex-
amination and report become necessary. 67 This delayed exami-
nation as to the defendant's mental condition at the time of the
crime may be seriously hampered for the evidence will be sketchy
and unreliable where the accused has been in a mental institu-
tion for a considerable period of time. The American Law In-
stitute's Model Penal Code avoids this difficulty by providing for
a very comprehensive lunacy report. 6 This report is to include
the nature of the examination, a general diagnosis of the mental
condition of the defendant, an opinion as to his capacity to
understand the proceedings and to assist in his defense, and an
opinion as to criminal responsibility at the time of the crime
164. ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 4, § 4.05(1) (1955).
165. Orfield suggested, in writing of a similar provision of the Massachusetts
Briggs Law, that the procedure would largely eliminate the so-called "battle of
experts." ORFIELD., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 281 (1947).
166. State v. Chinn, 229 La. 984, 87 So.2d 315 (1955).
167. The procedures for this examination' are set out in LA. R.S. 15:268
(1950).
168. ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 4, § 4.05(3) (1955).
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if notice of the intention to rely on the insanity defense has been
filed. Another solution might be to redraft the present articles
so as to empower the trial judge to order a report on the de-
fendant's mental condition at the time of the crime in any case
where it appears that the insanity defense may subsequently be
urged. The Massachusetts Briggs Law goes even further and
provides for routine mental examination before trial of all de-
fendants charged with capital crimes, or previously convicted
of a felony.169
The ALI Model Penal Code insanity procedures, proposed
after thorough discussion by a committee of leading trial law-
yers, judges, district attorneys, and psychiatrists, set out a num-
ber of other rules which are worthy of careful consideration.
Where the lunacy report shows extreme mental disease or de-
fect at the time of the crime, clearly excluding responsibility,
the trial judge is empowered to enter a judgment of acquittal
and order the defendant's commitment. 1 70 This provision avoids
the necessity of a trial in cases where the defendant's mental
irresponsibility is clear. The right of the defense to have a
psychiatrist of its own choosing examine and have reasonable
access to the defendant is clearly spelled out.1" The court may
also permit the defense psychiatrist to witness and participate
in the examination by the court-appointed psychiatrists."72 Full
benefit of expert testimony is assured by a flexible rule whereby
a psychiatrist who has examined the defendant will be afforded
an unrestricted opportunity to state and explain his diagnosis
of the defendant's mental condition at the time of the conduct
in question. 73 He will, of course, be subject to cross examination
as to the basis of his opinion.
Space limitations of a law review article have not permitted
a survey of all revision problems. Equally perplexing, and inter-
esting, questions are presented in other parts of the Code. These
relate to such important matters as recusation or absence of the
district attorney or the judge, 1 4 entry of a nolle prosequi and
its effect,"75 setting the case for trial and continuance, 176 the
169. MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 123, § 100A (1931).
170. ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 4, §§ 4.07(1), 4.08 (1955).
171. Id. § 4.07(2).
172. Id. §4.05(1).
173. Id. § 4.07(4).




REVISION OF LOUISIANA'S CODE
trial jury and its selection, 177 presence of the defendant at vari-
ous stages of the trial,'1 78 the conduct of the trial with its multi-
plicity of problems,'179 the conduct of the jury after the case is
submitted and its verdict, 8 0 the motions for a new trial and in
arrest of judgment,""' sentencing procedures, including such
antipodal matters as probation and the habitual offender law,
8 2
appeal,13 and execution of sentences.184 A mere recounting of
these phases of the criminal proceedings brings to mind many
problems which must be carefully considered in the contemplated
revision. Each procedure must be judged in the light of its prac-
tical operation. The rules must be complete, clearly stated and
fair - to the end that they will afford full protection to the
innocent and will, at the same time, facilitate the expeditious
trial and conviction of the guilty. It is easier to state than to
achieve these objectives. Fortunately, the practical benefits of
local experience will be available through an advisory committee
of judges, defense counsel, and district attorneys. The benefits
of nation-wide experience and research is obtainable through
such carefully prepared projects as the American Law Institute's
Code of Criminal Procedure and Model Penal Code, the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Uniform Rules. An added,
and very important step, in the revision process will be careful
and objective review of each rule by the Council of the Louisiana
State Law Institute - a body which is free from any appreciable
"defense" or "prosecution" leanings and whose sole interest is
in the improvement of Louisiana laws.
177. Id. §§ 337-362.
178. These rules are distributed throughout the Louisiana Code, but are treated
as a unit in the ALI Code.
179. LA. R.S. 15:332-397, 405, 406 (1950).
180. Id. 15:394-421.
181. Id. 15:505-520.
182. Id. 15:521-538.
183. Id. 15:539-564.
184. Id. 15:565-571.12.
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